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ABSTRACT 
Equality and Equity, prime principles of justice in creation and distribution of income and assets, have 
plural, circular and retroactive relationships with globalization, growth and poverty. The objective of this 
paper is to establish a notion that which of these principles is to be followed and by which institutions in 
order to tackle the despicable stigma of poverty. In this aim, the first section of paper presents critical 
evaluation of equity vs. equality debate, specifically focusing on the processes of creation and distribution 
of outcomes and opportunities. The second section draws on the relative significance of institutions, 
principally government and IFIs, in these processes in order to spur growth, equality and wellbeing. This 
follows to the third section exhibiting some policy implications and recommendations. The paper 
concludes that no particular form of institution or principle of justice is ‘panacea’ to social and economic 
objectives, including reducing wide inequalities.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Equality and Equity, prime principles of justice in creation and distribution of income and assets, have 
plural, circular and retroactive relationships with globalization, growth and poverty, with particular 
significance of national institutions like government and supranational institutions like international 
financial institutions (IFIs). The conceptual analysis of these relationships is important in these times 
when Washington Consensus has been failed to spur growth and eradicate poverty fast enough to meet 
MDGs (rising tides can drown many boats, instead of lifting all boats), along with increasing political 
tensions from ‘war on terror’. The evidence from theoretical and empirical studies implied that the nature 
and scope of inequality cannot be captured by income disparities alone; asset inequalities i.e. inequality of 
opportunity, like inequality in educational attainment, health standards, access to clean water and 
sanitation, access to government services etc. are indispensible social and economic indicators in order to 
gauge inequality (Sen,1973). In the distribution policies, asset equality (pro-poor investment in health and 
education) is deemed to be more practical and less politically-biased than equity principle at work in case 
of taxation, property rights, and land reforms. In the trinity of equity, equality and poverty, being 
complicated by increasing incidence of economic globalization, a variety of tradeoffs, dilemmas, traps, 
thresholds and vicious circles are involved (Bourguignon et al. 2007) to which there are no easy answers.  
 
In this respect, much consensus has been developed on “institutions matter” (North, 1994), but which 
institutions, under what conditions, and to what extent, are contentious and debatable concerns. 
 
In this aim, the paper is divided into three sections where first section presents critical evaluation of 
equity vs. equality debate, specifically focusing on the processes of creation and distribution of outcomes 
and opportunities. The second section draws on the relative significance of institutions, principally 
government and IFIs, in these processes in order to spur growth, equality and wellbeing. This follows to 
the third section exhibiting some policy implications and recommendations. The final section concludes 
the debate.  
 
I. EQUITY AND EQUALITY IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION – IS THERE 
ANY ‘PERFECT RECIPE’ FOR THE POOR?   
Economic globalization implies economic integration among countries, brought about by the movement 
of goods, services, technology and factors of production, directly affecting relative factor earnings 
between and within countries, and ultimately impacting economic growth and income inequality. So, 
apropos to economic globalization and ensuing Washington Consensus, the adjustment experiences in 
1980s and the stabilization and liberalization experiences in the 1990s resulted in the renewed attention to 
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the issues on inequality and poverty. Being out of fashion for many years among policy makers of rich 
countries, inequality and redistribution appeared as mere reference in the Millennium Development 
Goals. One stream of thought argued that the best way to tackle poverty is to grow out of poverty but 
income inequality usually results from deep rooted societal structures, which take time to change. Other 
stream of though viewed measures to reduce inequality as detrimental to growth and therefore not 
warranted during periods of adjustment when all emphasis is needed to be placed on reviving growth 
quickly. Such views are often contested (van der Hoeven, 1995, 2000; Ravallion, 1997), but part of 
mainstream discussions of academics and policy-makers since end of 1990s (Rodrik, 1998; Furman and 
Stiglitz, 1998; Tanzi and Chu, 1998). This increased focus is partly explained by economic reasons (i.e. 
new growth theory implies that large inequalities may be harmful to growth
1
) and partly by socio-political 
reasons (i.e. large inequalities may provoke a coalition of different groups in societies).  
 
Income inequality is not only hard to capture through consistent data sets, but also insufficient to measure 
the extent and depth of inequality. At the global level, the consensus is that the trend ever since 1820 has 
been one of divergence, with increasing income disparity between the world’s richest and poorest 
households, at least up until the Second World War (Pritchett, 1997). Some, however, argue that because 
of China’s extraordinarily rapid growth since 1980, global divergence not only slowed down, but also 
may have reversed in the last decade . Berry (2002) goes further to affirm that, after increasing for more 
than a century, global inequality has not changed very much since 1950. However, the nature and scope 
of inequality is impossible to be captured by income disparities alone. It must also take into account the 
asset inequality (asset inequality is typically greater than income inequality), but the absence of economic 
and social indicators makes it almost impossible to measure asset inequality.  
 
Some inequality is deemed to be necessary to spur incentives and to reward those with relatively more 
skill, drive or appetite for risk. At the end of the day, these entrepreneurs, although acting for themselves, 
also create wealth for the society as a whole. Moreover, equity is a fundamental concept for justice - the 
more one puts in, the more one deserves. Accordingly, the complete equality can end up on free-riding 
where incompetent eat the effort of others. This argument is usually backed by the advent of communism, 
                                                          
1 The discussion on inequality and growth has received impetus from authors who combined new growth theory, 
endoginizing technical progress, with political economic models, endoginizing political decisions. These authors 
argue that inequality is harmful to growth. There are several causal links underlying this notion. Links on a more 
traditional economic footing, include the effect of income inequality on the composition of the demand and on factor 
endowment affecting the supply of human capital. A more equal income distribution leads to an increased demand 
for industrial goods which triggers off innovation and growth. Growth is further enhanced by increased investment 
in education by low income groups, as a consequence of increased equality in income and capital, allowing them to 
build up stocks of human capital more rapidly Alesina and Perotti (1994). 
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its failure and finally collapse of Soviet Union. In theory, everyone was equal. But with no personal 
incentives, people’s desire to get ahead is harnessed, so there is very little drive behind an economy and, 
consequently, wealth creation is subdued. However, too little equality may have its own problems. Robert 
Reich, the former US Secretary of Labor, has written extensively on the problems of inequality, noted that 
it “leads to distress and misery for those at or near the bottom and anxiety for those in the middle. Left 
un-checked, it could also undermine the stability and moral authority of the nation” (Reich 1997). 
Although, academic literature used to stress the positive role of income inequality in rewarding ‘wealth 
creators’ as a way to encourage innovation and growth, there is now, however, growing impetus that 
inequality is bad for growth and poverty. One argument in this regard is that in an unequal society, elites 
find it easier to ‘control’ governments and other institutions, and use them for their own narrow interests, 
rather than the overall economic wellbeing.  It is only one of many inter-related aspects of inequality-
institutions relationship covered in next section. Inequality is much more than a technical barrier to 
growth or poverty reduction
2
.  
 
In this connection, social scientists have been, since long, actively trying to strike a balance between two 
relevant but conflicting principles of justice – equity and equality. Equity can be called ‘meritocracy’ 
highlighted by individual competition and self-reliance i.e. the more one gives, the more one should get. 
Equality reflects collective cooperation where each gets according to one’s need. The choice between 
equity and equality is complicated and the conflict between the two is timeless. The tension between the 
two is so severe even in political arenas that conservatives and democrats usually take opposing stances in 
policy-making on the basis of these two principles. According to the author Llosa Mario Vargas, 
“Prosperity or egalitarianism -- you have to choose. I favor freedom -- you never achieve real equality 
anyway; you simply sacrifice prosperity for an illusion”. Which one is fair – equity or equality? A 
number of empirical studies have established that fairness is an important economic force in labor 
markets, product markets, income and wealth redistribution policies, and government regulation. 
However, vital issues raised by John Stuart Mill in 19
th
 century about fairness even persist today. On one 
hand, there is ample research which spur the notions like equality preferences are consistent with 
observed intra-firm salary compression, equal payoffs facilitate, and equality has been central to much 
normative work (Rawls, 1971; Walzer, 1983). On the other hand, labor markets are characterized by 
increasing wage inequality, which is viewed partly due to productivity differences (Lemieux, MacLeod 
and Parent, 2009). The standard for inequality in most justice research is proportionality of rewards to 
                                                          
2 Writing in 500 BC, Plato reminded Athenian legislators about the moral abomination triggered by extreme 
inequality. ‘There should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty nor again excessive wealth…..for both 
are productive of great evil’ (quoted in HDR 2005, P.51) 
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contributions, which is called “equity”.  Various empirical studies have validated the economic 
significance of equity e.g. Gächter and Riedl (2005), Konow et al., (2008) etc. Equity and equality imply 
very large and important differences in the allocation and redistribution of social and economic resources, 
but no consensus has yet developed about which rule is fair, or, if multiple rules are fair, under what 
conditions each rule applies. 
 
In this context, it is relevant to shed some light on two broad redistributive principles - vertical equity and 
horizontal equity. The vertical equity (VE) is meant to assess the equity of policies’ impact on individuals 
with differing initial levels of "wellbeing" whereas horizontal equity (HE) helps evaluate the equity of the 
impact across individuals who are equal in all "relevant respects". In the context of the redistribution of 
income, VE usually demands that the net fiscal burden should increase with individuals’ capacity to pay 
i.e. income before tax. HE demands that individuals with equal capacities to pay should be treated equally 
by the net tax system. Perhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation is that people in 
equal positions should be treated equally. The principles of VE and HE are normally applied to the 
monetary dimension of the government’s impact (Duclos, 2006). However, material wellbeing is only one 
of the dimensions of wellbeing; other dimensions may be decisive in comparisons of the benefits and 
drawbacks associated with various government policies. These dimensions are closely related to Rawls’ 
primary goods and Sen’s capabilities like formal freedoms, capacity to escape from material poverty, 
capacity to participate in social and public life, capacity to achieve self-respect, peace and security, 
freedom of choice of production, consumption and lifestyle. In such a multidimensional context, HE 
could be refined as requiring that individuals who are ethically equal in each dimension of well-being 
should also be treated equally in each of these dimensions. This, of course, raises several issues, of which 
one of the most difficult is how to measure these multiple dimensions of well-being. To see it through the 
lens of opportunities, inequality in access to education, health facilities, or access to public services 
reflects the social face of poverty. As shown by Bourguignon et al (2003, 2007), inequality of opportunity 
due to circumstances beyond the control of individuals (being born in a particular sect, race, region, 
parents) accounts for a large share of income inequality in developing countries. It implies that 
dimensions of poverty are dynamic processes with different time horizons, leading to intergenerational 
poverty traps where low levels of education and health are combined with lack of employment and a high 
birth rate. It perpetuates low levels of health, education and so forth. It implies that unequal outcomes in 
one generation predetermine, provided there is no state intervention, the inequalities of opportunity of the 
next generation and the rate of growth of average incomes (Osberg, 1995). 
Here, it is significant to argue that growth can eradicate poverty or else, redistribution would be required 
to do the needful. If the benefits of growth are skewed to the rich, and the poor benefit only slightly, then 
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a much faster overall rate of growth would be required to get desired reduction in poverty. However, if 
widening inequalities mean that the poor are not benefitting at all or are experiencing a real deterioration 
in their living standards, then no amount of growth can help. The only solution then would be to 
redistribute in favor of the poor (Culpeper, 2005). The prospect of redistribution poses a serious challenge 
to those who believe that any interference in market-determined incomes weakens the incentives to invest 
and prosper, and therefore undermines growth itself. In this context, an important distinction to be made 
is between the distribution of income and the distribution of assets, particularly land. Even if there are 
unhindered incentives to grow and prosper, unequal land distribution provides large landowners with 
greater opportunities than small landholders. But land reforms are so politically contentious that 
substantial redistribution of this asset is unlikely to take place, unless market-based mechanisms are 
available (World Bank, 2001). Therefore, for those resistant to policies of income redistribution, the focus 
of asset distribution remained on human capital. Skewness of investment in education and health towards 
the poor is politically easier than land reform, and it can be expected to improve the income and assets of 
the poor via intergenerational model. It reflects the favor for equality of opportunity (e.g. access to 
education, freedom from discrimination, equality before the law), with only a minor role for greater 
equality of outcome, i.e. below poverty line or reducing absolute destitution. Be it progressive taxation or 
land reforms, the processes and vehicles of redistribution need to be treated with great caution. Here, the 
state and international financial institutions imply a host of crucial facets, which are discussed in next 
section.   
 
This section is deemed to be ended from where it began.  It is still contentiously debatable that policies of 
economic globalization and liberalization are improving or worsening inequalities. However, it is also 
true that globalization, as increased international economic integration, could provide considerable 
benefits through growing incomes and employment opportunities. The hoax, particularly for developing 
countries, is to capture the benefits available from trade, capital flows and migration, while avoiding the 
costs (UNDP 1999). In this regard, developing countries should be allowed to adopt a logical (but wishful 
as it seems at this point of time) approach. It means that if liberalization has a significantly negative 
impact on income, asset distribution, employment and inequality, then developing countries should 
choose the speed and sequencing of liberalization measures that have significantly positive impact. 
Rodrik (2001) goes further by arguing for the right of developing countries to opt for “institutional 
arrangements” that work in the right directions, for example, by protecting domestic markets. Thus, 
increased access to industrial country markets should not only be achieved by giving industrial countries 
corresponding access to developing country markets, where such access undermines local population. 
This is particularly the case where industrial countries distort markets through subsidies in agriculture. In 
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this aim, the next section is going to give prominent impetus to the role of international financial 
institutions vis-à-vis government. 
 
II. STATE VS. IFIs – POOR NEED ‘FRIENDSHIP” BETWEEN THE TWO: 
The increased recognition of the role of institutions in growth, equality and poverty processes is linked to 
developments in economic theory, apropos to the mixed results of reform programs and aid flows directed 
towards developing world. Institutions can be classified in various ways e.g. macroeconomic or 
microeconomic, state or non-state, market or non-market, formal or informal. They may also be either 
internal to states or external, like ‘supranational’ institutions involved in global governance. These 
supranational institutions play a crucial role in developing countries, whose economies and national 
institutions are often dependent on the international financial institutions (IFIs). The economic role of IFIs 
gained significance from the concepts of poverty traps, vicious circles and threshold effects. Below 
certain income thresholds, poor countries can no longer benefit from increasing returns, making massive 
capital injections indispensible. As explained by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), breaking the processes 
associated with poverty traps requires “Big Push” policies. These policies may be designed and 
implemented either by state or IFIs or both.  
 
Although there is now a consensus that institutions are important for growth and poverty, it is still 
difficult to determine how to take them functionally in order to design and implement effective policies 
for poverty reduction. There are several issues on which no agreement exists, including but not limited to, 
the role of the state; the direction of causalities (from institutions to growth, or from growth to 
institutions); the endogenous nature of institutions with respect to other factors of growth and poverty, 
such as market structure, geography, integration in the international economy and dependence on 
commodities exports; the relative contribution of all these factors; and the channels through which these 
causalities work (Sindzingre, 2005). Reforms may act on institutions directly or on other factors that in 
turn affect institutions, as in the case of liberalisation reforms. 
 
The analysis of institutions has been refined by the impact of trade liberalisation and globalization. 
Empirical evidence has outcasted the traditional forms or variables of institutions necessary for growth 
such as secured property rights, low level of corruption, government accountability and transparency. 
Unorthodox institutional ingredients e.g. state intervention and bureaucracy had enabled developmental 
states like Korea and Taiwan to exhibit spectacular growth rates (Culpeper, 2005). According to Rodrik 
(2007), China has registered high growth rates in the absence of institutions that secure and formally 
delimit property rights. Contrary to the arguments of Dollar and Kraay (2003), some “heterodox” 
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economists have affirmed that countries displaying outstanding growth and poverty reduction, such as 
China, have achieved this performance not as a result of liberalisation policies but policies similar to 
those adopted by the Asian developmental states.  Such economists consider that state can play an 
effective role for promoting growth and reducing income & asset inequality and poverty. However, IFIs 
striving for similar goals in developing nations, since 1980s till now, is somewhat confused in this regard. 
 
Limiting the role of the state has been a point of central focus during liberalization reforms of 1980s and 
1990s. Crises-stricken countries, particularly from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, had to agree to 
the conditionalities of IFIs to get financing from them.  These conditionalities were strongly influenced by 
conception of the state as the “culprit”, responsible for the sluggish growth and bad macroeconomic 
policies. The stabilization and structural adjustment programs by IMF and World Bank therefore tried to 
reduce the intervention of the state and state institutions in the economy, and recommended the 
privatization of public enterprises. These programs were aimed at dismantling public enterprises and state 
institutions as they were perceived as obstacles to market forces, thereby causing budget overruns and 
economic distortion. IFIs also gave social arguments for these anti-state reforms i.e. the inefficiency and 
costliness of state institutions is primarily borne by the poorest. Interestingly, the state and national 
institutions were seen as impediments to implementation of reforms and growth, while external 
institutions, i.e. IFIs, enjoyed full legitimacy to transform a country from outside, through the use of 
conditionality. However, academic research of Amartya Sen and Dani Rodrik influenced IFIs at the end 
of 1990s to support the idea that growth is associated with “high quality” institutions and public sector. It 
is thus established that market forces by themselves cannot ensure efficient outcomes, let alone equitable 
ones. The success of theories of market failure and information asymmetries, put forward by Joseph 
Stiglitz among others, undoubtedly contributed to this change in perspective on the role of the state. 
Privatizations made as part of reform program with minimalistic role of state met with mixed success, 
which recognized the vital role of state as guarantor of property rights and contracts. 
 
One of the most important questions of modem times is how to fabricate government policy so that the 
overall wellbeing advances for the benefit of all classes i.e. equity vs. equality. Researchers like Tullock 
(1983) and Peltzman (1980) identified redistribution as the most important function of government, and 
that it is a major source of the growth in the size of the fiscal state (Scully, 2002). To spur economic 
growth, government has to get out of the way of personal decision making and the forces and 
consequences of free market exchange.  However, government does contribute to economic growth by 
providing infrastructure, public health facilities, expanding educational opportunities, and protecting 
property and contract. Since resources are required for these activities, therefore, some intervention in 
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market outcomes or failures is admissible
3
. Up to some level, these activities are growth-promoting. But 
beyond a certain size of the fiscal state, taxation, transfers, and market intervention are about 
redistribution and have a price. As Okun (1975) pointed out, transfers are made with a “leaky bucket” i.e. 
loss of national output arising from redistribution. Changes in distribution of assets and human capital 
should become a necessary complement of macroeconomic policies to reduce inequality and stimulate 
growth (Scully, 2002). It thus weakens the arguments often made that policies of  (re)distribution are less 
relevant than stimulating overall growth in a poverty alleviation strategy because a steady state growth 
will lift gradually all people i.e. rising tides lift all boats! 
 
By definition, tax policies are aimed at the redistribution of income in the economy, however, the extent 
of this possibility is often questionable. In many developing countries, tax systems rely heavily upon 
indirect taxes, making tax system regressive rather than progressive. A tax base in favor of direct taxes 
i.e. Progressive taxation could make secondary income distribution much more equal. However, there is 
little consensus on whether income distribution is desirable for equality and how to create greater equality 
of outcomes for overall wellbeing. In this regard, decision makers disagree whether heavy taxes should be 
paid by a billionaire celebrity to fund schools and hospitals for the poor
4
. IFIs are highly cautious about 
the potential economic disruption caused by high income taxes or radical land reforms, whereas others 
believe that progressive redistribution of assets is needed to kick-start a virtuous cycle of equity, equality 
and growth.  
 
While discussing government policies to create and distribute income and assets, the role of politics 
cannot be ignored. As per economics of inequality, the possibility of acquiring factors of production, the 
right to take benefit from them and initial endowment determine each person’s amount of income 
(Champernowne and Cowell, 1998). Institutional and political processes affect this amount because they 
transform the individual’s incentives and constraints the range of activities they can undertake. These 
processes set the rules that figure out property rights and the rewards of each factor. There are various 
cross-section and panel data methods to investigate empirically the effect of property rights on income 
inequality in developing countries. Such institutions can aggravate inequality if they preserve or increase 
                                                          
3 International mobility of capital and labour, along with other developments by technology and globalization such 
as e-commerce, derivatives & hedge funds, and offshore financial centers, is likely to undermine the revenues that 
states need to undertake such initiatives—whether they involve reallocation of funding to education, health and 
social expenditures, redistribution of assets such as land, or simply using income taxation.  
4
 When asked for his views on inequality and redistribution in the 2001 election campaign, the British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, famously bent the question by replying ‘It's not a burning ambition for me to make sure that 
David Beckham earns less money’ (Guardian, Dec 23, 2005) 
9 
 
the economic and political interests of privileged minorities. For instance, one’s property rights can also 
be protected by weakening the risk of expropriation of productive assets via controlling the political 
system, by erecting barriers to entry, or by setting favorable tax regimes, as well as engaging in rent-
seeking activities (Easaw and Savoia, 2009). Bourguignon et al. (2007) call for a systematic analysis of 
the effect of institutions on the persistence of inequality. Bowles (2004) has used the term “institutional 
poverty traps” to refer to institutional arrangements that prompt inequality. Recent literature suggests that 
the actual trajectory of inequality could depend on institutional arrangements implemented by 
governments to distribute the gains of economic growth across the population (Acemoglu et al., 2005).  
The redistributive role of democracies could be ‘indirect’, rather than directly through public expenditure. 
Robinson (2001) argued and provided evidence that democracies redistribute by increasing the wages 
through reforms of labour market institutions; e.g. unionization to improve the bargaining power, higher 
minimum wages, favorable hiring and firing practices etc. Referring to Acemoglu (2008), it is suggested 
that the property rights work differently in democratic environments than in oligarchic ones. In the latter, 
the elite minorities have enough political power to control markets by erecting entry barriers e.g. through 
direct regulation, obtaining subsidized credit or inputs etc. as well as by guarding themselves from 
expropriation and from redistributive taxation, thereby protecting their own property rights. In most cases, 
the property rights in developing economies reflect the unequal balance of political power. Therefore, 
economic and social inequality is also explained by the interplay of political and economic institutions
5
.  
 
In this connection, an important aspect is the international redistribution of wealth, in form of 
development aid, mostly directed by IFIs upon fulfillment of conditionalities by developing countries. In 
late 1990s, the mixed results of development aid gave rise to serious questions about its relevance for 
institutions of developing countries. Aid flows can finance the costs of reform (new regulations, state of 
law, assistance in holding elections, etc.) or strengthen young and fragile institutions or improve the legal 
and regulatory framework. However, aid can also perpetuate corruption while recipient government may 
exhibit a weak “ownership” of the reforms on which these financial flows depend.  The growing concern 
about the effectiveness of aid led economists to use a criterion of allocation – the quality of a recipient 
country’s institutions and policies. Various studies have been undertaken to see whether observed 
allocation of aid is influenced by the quality of institutions and policies in recipient. Most prominently, 
Collier and Dollar (2002) used this new approach to suggest optimal allocation of aid and suggested a 
                                                          
5 Even internationally, political decisions have also piled up global economic governance against the poorest 
countries, widening the gulf between rich and poor nations. The powerful nations have asserted on opening up 
Southern markets to flows of capital and goods, where transnational corporations take the benefit, while restricting 
the flows human capital (immigration laws) and knowledge (intellectual property laws) that would largely be 
advantageous to the poor nations. 
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growth equation that focused on decreasing marginal effectiveness of aid depending on the quality of 
institutions and policies. IFIs put forward the notions of capacity building and institution building for the 
states whose institutions have deteriorated. The reforms stemming from the political, social or economic 
conceptions of public institutions face the general problem that effectiveness of external aid has its limits 
when focusing on a notion as multidimensional as that of institutions. Since the 1990s, donors have been 
in agreement with academic economists on the issue of “institutions matter” and believe that a share of 
aid should go towards institution building.  However, there are still many traps and unexpected effects, no 
matter whether the aid in question directs towards the building of legal systems or in financial flows. 
 
Any institution can be growth-promoting in theory, but whether it is so in practice can only be observed 
ex post because in case of growth, the content of institutions matters more than their form, as does the 
way the various institutions are combined in a given society. What is necessary is a government capable 
of taking action and institutions capable of easing social conflicts, including those arising from 
globalization and trade liberalisation. A series of studies, notably by Dani Rodrik, have shown that 
countries need strong, effective institutions in order to dampen the negative effects of globalization while 
reaping the benefits. Endogeneity affects all the causal and circular relationships among globalization, 
institutions, economic policies, inequality, growth, and poverty. Some of these relationships are touched 
in section I and II which have various policy implications, to be discussed in next section. 
 
III. POLICY IMPLICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The traditional sources of inequality, such as land concentration, urban bias and inequality in education, 
although still significant, do not appear to be the principle causes of worsening inequality during last three 
decades. Although trade is deemed as one of the inequality transmission mechanisms, however, there are 
certain new sources of inequality in current times, such as excessively liberal economic policy regimes, 
and the way in which such policies have been carried out (Cornia and Court 2001). In particular, 
macroeconomic stabilization policies, financial sector and capital account regulation, and labour market 
policies have all contributed toward widening inequalities, and therefore need to be reconsidered.  
 
In this connection, IFIs and multilateral development agencies, other than World Bank and IMF, are 
relatively focused, yet slightly ‘wishful’ in terms of global governance. In Globalization with a Human 
Face, UNDP report (1999) criticized rising imbalance between rapidly expanding global markets and 
inadequate global governance. “When the market goes too far in dominating social and political 
outcomes, the opportunities and rewards of globalization spread unequally and inequitably—
concentrating power and wealth in a select group of people, nations and corporations, marginalizing the 
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others…The challenge is…not to stop the expansion of global markets [but] to find the rules and 
institutions for stronger governance—local, national regional and global…to ensure that globalization 
works for people”. Such extensive and rigorous changes in global governance would surely introduce 
profound modifications in the global rules of the game, likely to be in favor of the poor countries and 
people. Indeed, these changes apparently seem completely unrealistic. Because of this very reason, they 
are unlikely to come about in the foreseeable future. But they reveal a fundamental notion that current 
globalization policies are not going to change until the entire superstructure of global governance is 
altered. In asserting that governments of developing countries must strive harder to manage profits, 
integration and distribution in order to increase domestic investment and growth, UNCTAD (1997) 
challenged the laissez-faire version of the liberalization, which emphasizes a state with little or no 
affiance in the economy, and recommends a trickle-down approach to growth and distribution. Moreover, 
it took a more realistic view of the potential for global reform in the current system, a system which is 
presumed to predominantly meet the needs and objectives of the industrial countries. UNDESA report 
(2001) give central role to the ‘market access for the poorest countries’ as “a route out of poverty” and 
therefore calls the industrial countries to take the necessary measures for eliminating protectionism, and 
international institutions for providing increased protection for countries vulnerable to price fluctuations. 
 
Wide income and asset inequalities among countries require action on many fronts. Rich countries could 
start by stopping themselves to do detrimental actions e.g. unfairly restricting migration, denying firms 
from developing nations the access to the knowledge and technology etc. Although some progress has 
been made on allocation and effectiveness of debt and aid, however, there is real reluctance to make trade 
fair for developing countries. While debt and aid are politically straightforward, whereas trade reforms in 
favor of poor takes real political courage, which is not ample as reflected from Doha Round. The failures 
of Washington Consensus policies across large population of the developing world have led to a ‘crisis of 
trust’ in the IMF and the World Bank. At the very least, this crisis should loosen the economic straitjacket 
on the governments of developing countries, allowing them to follow a more heterodox approach to 
growth and development. The ‘same destination, different speeds’ of the liberalizers is becoming a more 
historically literate ‘same destination, different paths’ (Green, 2008). 
 
With the collapse of East European Communism, it is established that there must be a balance between 
equality and equity. If society chooses a centrist strategy, there are a variety of methods to ensure 
maximization of the benefits of both equity and equality. Governments can control economic levers; for 
example increase or decrease the minimum wage, taxes for income or consumption. Certain regulatory 
levers can also be employed to smooth wide inequalities. Societies can also balance equity with equality 
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through strong democratic processes. However, the theory of institutions separates the form of institutions 
from the content of institutions, showing that a given institutional form, such as democracy or market-
economy institutions, does not guarantee that the actual content will correspond to the apparent form. For 
instance, market institutions may be driven by social norms (i.e. content) stemming from “traditional” 
institutions (kinship, caste hierarchies). Similarly, institutions that are democratic in form may in fact be 
driven by authoritarian political mechanisms. Moreover, many other political and social factors interfere 
with the channels of economic causality. Multiple causes may be entangled in unique local contexts, 
thereby suggesting the abolition of “one-size-fits-all” approach. 
 
In order to grow out of poverty, assets of the poor are to be built through investment in education, health 
and redistribution of other assets. It is not only equitable but also improves growth and future poverty. 
However, this policy can be contentious because on one hand, allocation of resources for education and 
health of poor would impose opportunity cost on upper and middle class and on the other hand, the 
redistribution of fixed assets such as land is very complex, politicized and multi-faceted. Moreover, it is 
also established that income inequality is growing and it needs to be restricted for growth and 
development. Therefore, redistributive policies through taxes and subsidies biased in favor of poor are 
recommended to be carried on a continuous basis. Due to mixed opinions on this notch, the measures 
used would have to be compatible with keeping incentives for growth and with the notion of “sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals” in fiscal policy.  
 
The significance of political institutions and their power must be recognized and tackled meticulously. As 
argued by World Bank, the way to ‘break the power and inequality vicious circle’ is to recognize that 
‘societies prosperous today are so because they have developed more egalitarian distributions of political 
power, while poor societies often suffer from unbalanced distributions’ (WDR 2006, P.108). Therefore, 
the first thing that must be redistributed, before incomes and assets, is power.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The causal relationships work in several directions and involve intermediate causes when equity, equality 
and poverty are taken into account in the scenario of economic globalization. In such situation, the 
content of institutions matters more than their form, as does the way national and international institutions 
are combined in a given society. The same philosophy has to be applied on “equity vs. equality” dilemma; 
principal concern should be on the progress in achieving fundamental social and economic objectives, 
including the reduction of inequality, not on whether the policies adopted strictly adhere to preconceived 
notions of ‘what is ideal idol of justice?’.  
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